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Abstract 
We have investigated how EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS) has associated to the development 
of earnings of individual employees who have worked in regulated manufacturing factors in Finland 
when the policy started in 2005. Their earnings are compared to earnings of individuals, who 
worked in same sectors, but in smaller installations that were not regulated by the policy. The follow-
up of individuals between 2000-2016 shows that the workers in EU ETS sectors had on average 
EUR 5 000 higher annual earnings compared to the control group before the policy started and this 
difference was diminished by an average EUR 2 800 after the policy started. 
   It seems that this decrease is due to lower employment rate. The treatment group had more than 
4 percent unit lower employment rate compared to the control group, which in 2016 translates into 
7.5 % lower employment. The earnings of those who were employed decreased by EUR 2 300 when 
the policy started, but otherwise the employed employees had EUR 5 000 higher earnings compared 
to the control group also after the policy started. Our set-up doesn’t allow a full causal interpretation 
that the decrease if fully influenced by the policy, as different industrial sectors are disproportionally 
represented in the treatment and control group. 
   The previous literature has shown 2 percent decrease in employment and no effect on wages at 
company-level. At installation-level the effect on employment has been a 7 % decrease, which is in 
line with our result. We have used individual-based data on annual earnings, which have included 
information of working station, which was matched to the information of installations’ participation 
to the policy. As participation to EU ETS is determined at installation-level, our set-up allows more 
precise results than those conducted at company-level. 
   The result seems to support pollution haven -hypothesis, which states that the policy makes 
regulated entities less competitive due to increased costs, and therefore production or market shares 
are outsourced to regions with laxer environmental policies. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Olemme tarkastelleet EU:n päästökaupan (EU ETS) yhteyttä säännösteltyjen teollisuuslaitosten 
työntekijöiden ansiotuloihin Suomessa päästökaupan alettua vuonna 2005. Säännöstellyissä 
laitoksissa päästökaupan alun hetkellä työskennelleiden työntekijöiden ansiotulojen kehitystä on 
verrattu sellaisten työntekijöiden ansiotuloihin, jotka työskentelivät samaan aikaan vastaavien 
teollisuusalojen laitoksissa, mutta eivät kuuluneet päästökauppaan pienen kapasiteettinsa takia. 
Ansiotulojen seuranta vuosina 2000-2016 näyttää, että reguloitujen laitosten työntekijöiden 
vuosiansiotulot olivat keskimäärin 5 000 euroa suuremmat ennen päästökaupan alkua, mutta 
palkkaero laski keskimäärin 2 800 eurolla päästökaupan alettua. 
   Keskimääräisten ansiotulojen lasku näyttää johtuvan matalammasta työllisyysasteesta. 
Säännösteltyjen laitosten työntekijöiden työllisyysaste oli yli 4 prosenttiyksikköä verrokkeja 
matalampi, mikä vuonna 2016 tarkoitti 7.5 % matalampaa työllisyyttä. Työssäkäyvien ansiotulot 
laskivat 2 300 eurolla heti päästökaupan alkamisen jälkeen verrokkeihin nähden, mutta muutoin 
työssäkäyvät säilyttävät 5000 euron ansiotuloeron myös päästökaupan alettua. 
Tutkimusasetelmamme ei takaa, että kyseessä olisi juuri päästökaupan aiheuttama lasku, sillä eri 
teollisuusalat ovat epäsuhdasti edustettu koe- ja verrokkiryhmässä. Tulos antaa suuntaa-antavan 
lähtökohdan tarkemmalle syy-seurausanalyysille päästökaupan vaikutuksista työllisyyteen ja 
ansiotuloihin. 
Aiemmissa tutkimuksissa EU:n päästökaupalla on havaittu 2 prosentin negatiivinen vaikutus 
työllisyyteen yritystasolla, mutta ei vaikutusta palkkoihin. Laitoskohtaisessa tarkastelussa 
työllisyysvaikutus oli haivaittu olevan 7 %, mikä vastaa havaintoamme. Olemme käyttäneet dataa 
yksilöiden ansiotulojen ja työllisyyden kehityksestä, jossa on ollut mukana tieto toimipaikasta, joka 
on pystytty yhdistämään tietoon laitosten päästökauppaan kuulumisesta. Koska EU:n 
päästökauppaan kuuluminen määritellään laitoskohtaisesti, tutkimusasetelmamme takaa 
yritystasolla tehtyjä tarkasteluja tarkemmat tulokset yksilöiden näkökulmasta. 
Tuloksemme näyttäisi viittaavan ns. pollution haven -hypoteesiin (päästöjen 
turvasatamahypoteesi), jonka mukaan päästökaupan kustannukset heikentävät yritysten 
kilpailukykyä, ja näin ollen tuotanto tai markkinaosuudet siirtyvät vähemmän säännöstellyille 
aluille. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this thesis is to study the potential effect of EU’s Emission Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) on the earnings of the employees, who have worked in regulated manufacturing 
installations. Installations mean manufacturing factories. EU ETS is an emission reduction 
policy, which has set an absolute and yearly declining maximum amount of emissions within 
its area for the regulated sectors. The cap is divided into allowances, which installations must 
surrender for their verified emissions. Installations have received allowances also for free, 
but if their emission exceeds this limit, they must acquire allowances from auctions or from 
other participants from secondary markets. 
As the policy imposes costs to the companies, the producer can pass-through the cost to the 
end-consumers if the demand is inelastic to changes in price. If the market price is fixed due 
to international competition, the producer must bear the cost of the policy and either decrease 
the whole production to match the market price to the marginal cost. Either the cost falls to 
the most flexible part of the production, supply of labour as one factor. 
In this study, the earnings of individual employees are drawn from combined employer-
employee dataset from Statistics Finland. The Finnish Longitudinal Employer–Employee 
Data (FLEED) includes information of annual earnings of Finnish working-age residents 
and their working station. The working stations of employees are matched to information 
from the data of energy use in manufacturing sectors produced by Statistics Finland, which 
included information of installations participation to the policy. The earnings of employees 
who worked in installation when the policy started in 2005 are compared to the earnings of 
employees who worked in same industries, but in non-regulated and therefore smaller 
installations. 
The number of ex-post empirical studies on the effect of EU ETS is somewhat limited, as 
data comes with a delay and a credible control group is difficult to form in an EU-wide 
policy. Previous study at company-level had found no effect on wages and a 2 % decrease 
in employment when the policy started (Marin, Marino and Pellegrin, 2018). Although the 
policy has been successful to reduce the emission within the sectors, the negative impact 
seems to be limited in the light of the relevant literature on the issue. 
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On general level, the policy could lead to three different kind of outcome: pollution haven 
hypothesis, Porter hypothesis or zero effect. Firstly, pollution haven hypothesis presumes 
the competitiveness of the regulated companies would decline because of increased costs. 
This would be detected as negative effect on aggregate earnings, as employment would 
decrease as production would decrease. Secondly, Porter hypothesis states that regulation 
induces innovation and gives a first mover advantage improving competitiveness as 
companies become more aware of their use of resources (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). 
This could be detected as positive effect on earnings, as employment would be in demand 
and this would reflect as an upward pressure on wages. Thirdly, zero effect could be that the 
costs of the policy have been so minor for the companies that there is no significant change 
in employment or earnings. 
Our empirical results show that the aggregated average earnings of employees in regulated 
installations have decreased compared to their controls. A lower employment seems to drive 
this difference.  A causal relationship would need more delicate identification strategy, but 
this result indicates that the pollution haven hypothesis seems strongest to hold in the light 
of the first 10 years of the policy in force. 
1.1 Research objectives 
The research objective is to study whether EU’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has 
affected employees’ earnings and employment in installation that are regulated by EU ETS 
policy. EU ETS covers only large installations, which belong to heavy-emitting industries 
and have above threshold maximum production capacity. Otherwise similar installations in 
same industries but below the thresholds are not part of emission trading. We use this 
threshold determination as our identification strategy. 
We use data of yearly earnings of employees from Statistics Finland, who work in 
installations just above and just below the capacity thresholds. We try to identify whether 
EU ETS has had impact on employees’ earnings in Finland. We use panel data OLS-
regression to analyse the difference in the development of these two groups to identify the 
treatment effect. 
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1.2 Structure of the thesis 
Firstly, in chapter two we introduce to the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS): basic 
elements of it, how and when it was developed. Then we compare emission reduction to EU 
ETS targets. We also look at the emissions associated with consumption to reflect whether 
emissions are outsourced to other areas. 
In chapter three we introduce how the costs of the policy could affect the manufacturing 
supply by passing-through the costs to end-consumers or bearing them within the production. 
Employees are affected if increased costs lead to reduction in production or that costs are 
saved using the flexibility of the supply of labour. We put in proportion the costs of the 
policy and personnel costs compared to other operative costs of regulated companies using 
Neste and Outokumpu’s steel factory as examples. 
In chapter four, the literature review summaries the results and set-ups of empirical papers 
that have studied the effect of EU ETS on competitiveness, innovation, employment and 
wages. 
In chapter five we introduce in more detail the data, empirical set-up and descriptive statistics 
of the treatment and control group. In chapter six we introduce the findings and caveats of 
the study. In chapter seven we conclude the main results, their practical implications and 
suggestions for further research. 
2 EU EMISSION TRADING SCHEME 
Decision-makers in Europe concerned of the carbon dioxide influenced climate change in 
early 1990’s and wanted to find a cost-efficient solution to steer production or consumption 
away from growing path of greenhouse gas emissions. EU’s decision makers came up with 
an EU-wide, market-based solution, which they launched in five years from idea to EU-wide 
legislation. The cap and number of emission allowances was set generously, equalling or 
even exceeding current demand of the member states at a time, making the policy politically 
implementable. The impact on international competitiveness and carbon leakage has been a 
concern. 
A policy that includes the externalities of the emissions as costs for the producers was 
needed. Lyubich, Shapiro and Walker (2018) studied heterogeneity in energy and CO2 
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productivity for US manufacturing sector in 2006 and 2007. They counted the average 
dollars of output per dollar of energy input or per ton of CO2 emission. They included also 
the indirect emissions from intermediate goods. Difference between the productivity of the 
lowest and highest ten percent was 2.27 log points, which translates into 870 percent 
difference in emission productivity using 375 within-industry 90-10 dispersion measures. 
The productivity difference means that energy efficiency could be easily improved, if firms 
were incentivized to do so. 
Even though the EU ETS has been running for fifteen years, we have mostly data and 
research from the first two phases between 2005-2007 and 2008-2012. In the early phases 
most of the allowances were allocated for free, but a larger share of them has been auctioned 
after 2013. In the third phase annual caps have decreased by fixed 1.74 % and the price of 
an allowance has risen since 2017 from below EUR 5 to quite steady above EUR 20 
(Sandberg -website, EUA price). 
 
Figure 1: Current and upcoming carbon pricing schemes in the world. Source: Carbon Pricing Dashboard, 
World Bank. Referred in March, 2020. 
It is important to study the total effects of EU’s main environmental policy, as other similar 
carbon pricing policies are being implemented and evolving. New carbon tax -regimes and 
emission trading systems have been implemented or scheduled, for example in California 
and China as seen in Figure 1. 
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2.1 Institutional elements of EU ETS 
The EU ETS covers 12 000 power stations and manufacturing plants in the 28 EU Member 
States and in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, as well as 1400 aircraft operators operating 
intra ETS area (European Environment Agency, 2018). In Finland 460 plants surrendered 
allowances in 2017 according to Finnish Energy Authority. 45 % of total EU greenhouse gas 
emissions are regulated by the policy within EU. The EU ETS remains the world’s largest 
emissions trading market, accounting for over three-quarters of international carbon trading. 
(European Commission, Factsheet of EU ETS, 2016) 
EU’s Emission Trading Scheme or System (EU ETS) is EU’s main environmental policy to 
reduce greenhouse gas -emissions (GHG) in the atmosphere affecting global warming and 
climate change. The objective of European Council is to limit global average temperature 
increase to 2 °C above pre-industrial level (European Council, 7224/1/07). Regulated 
industries are energy-intensive industries within the manufacturing and the power sector, i.e. 
combustion installations with a rated thermal input capacity of at least 20 MW, refineries, 
coke ovens, steel plants, and installations producing cement clinker, lime, bricks, glass, pulp 
and paper. Since 2012, the aviation sector has also been added to the EU ETS. (Eugénie, 
Sommerfeld, 2019). 
 
EU ETS works by setting a cap on the maximum level of emissions for the sectors covered 
for each period called phases. The cap guarantees that emissions won’t reach the pre-defined 
level in the period the cap applies. Covered installations are obliged to submit an EU 
emission allowance (EUA) for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2 eq.) emitted 
within a year. (Chandreyee and Velten, 2014). If installation fails to surrender enough 
allowances in time, the penalty is 100 euros per tCO2 in addition to submitting the required 
allowances (European Commission, EU ETS handbook, 2015). 
 
In each period allowances are allocated for free or they are auctioned for participating 
installations. Emitters whose abatement costs are lower than the EUA price find it profitable 
to reduce emissions. Emitters with high reduction costs can buy EUAs and postpone their 
own action thereby complying with the GHG policy more cheaply than they otherwise would 
have been able to. (Chandreyee and Velten, 2014.) 
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Allowances are accurately tracked in Union registry, where each participant of EU ETS must 
open an account. Anyone can possess an account and is able to buy and sell allowances 
regardless if they are participating to the policy or not. Trading is possible without brokers 
and can be used for speculative purposes as well. (Chandreyee and Velten, 2014). 
2.2 Development of EU ETS 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a scientific intergovernmental body 
under the auspice of the United Nations, launched its first summary of climate change in 
1990. In 1993 EU Council established decision (93/389/EEC), which mandated Member 
States to monitor and report their annual GHG emissions. Regulatory measures concerning 
energy efficiency were implemented, such as labelling standards for household appliances. 
(Prahl, Hofmann 2014). 
In climate summit in Kyoto in 1997 industrialized countries agreed to reduce their emissions 
during commitment period 2008-2012 by 8 % compared to 1990 levels. In the start of new 
millennium, EU started actively improving its climate policies by launching the European 
Climate Change Programme (ECCP), which examined possibilities for GHG emissions 
reduction and how to meet Kyoto targets. From this programme European Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS) was introduced. EU ETS was launched as a directive (2003/87/EC) in 
October 2003. (Prahl, Hofmann 2014). The directive determines regulated industries and 
their installation maximum capacity thresholds, which determine does installation fall within 
the policy or not. The thresholds are the following (2003/87/EC): 
▪ Energy activities: Combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 
20 MW 
▪ Production and processing of ferrous metals: installations for the production of pig 
iron or steel (primary or secondary fusion) including continuous casting, with a 
capacity exceeding 2,5 tonnes per hour 
▪ Mineral industry: Installations for the production of cement clinker in rotary kilns 
with a production capacity exceeding 500 tonnes per day or lime in rotary kilns with 
a production capacity exceeding 50 tonnes per day or in other furnaces with a 
production capacity exceeding 50 tonnes per day 
▪ Mineral industry: Installations for the manufacture of glass including glass fibre with 
a melting capacity exceeding 20 tonnes per day 
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▪ Mineral industry: Installations for the manufacture of ceramic products by firing, in 
particular roofing tiles, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, stoneware or porcelain, with a 
production capacity exceeding 75 tonnes per day, and/or with a kiln capacity 
exceeding 4 m3 and with a setting density per kiln exceeding 300 kg/m3 
▪ Other activities: paper and board with a production capacity exceeding 20 tonnes per 
day 
This means that the participation to the policy is determined by quite fixed characteristics of 
the installations. In theory, the plants could avoid the policy by downsizing their production 
capacity, but presumably with high cost in lost production and equipment change. 
EU ETS started the 1st of January 2005. The directive 2003/87/EC instructed to allocate 
almost all allowances for free in the beginning of the policy. In Phase I (2005-2007) at least 
95 % of allowances had to be allocated for free. In Phase II (2008-2012) free allowance 
minimum requirement drop to 90 %. 
The initial amount for allowances was determined for each Member state by their own 
request in form of national allocation plans, which the European Commission assessed. 
Member states decided for themselves the total number of allowances as well as how they 
were allocated to installations. As an aggregate from these national allocations became the 
EU-wide cap. European Commission required adjustments in plans if they were inconsistent 
with the progress towards Kyoto targets. (European Commission, national allocation plans). 
In 2007 the Head of Member states introduced their 20-20-20 by 2020 -target (224/1/07).  
EU made commitment to achieve at least 20 % reduction by 2020. The Council targeted to 
increase energy efficiency in the EU to save 20 % of the EU's energy consumption compared 
to projections for 2020. Also 20 % of overall energy use should be from renewable energy 
sources in EU by 2020. 
In 2009 amendment Council decided to have a single EU-wide cap instead of national caps 
for each member state for the phase III (2013-2020). Also, the cap started to decrease by 
1.74 % linearly annually. The share of free allocation of allowances was decreased, and in 
2013 40 % of allowances were auctioned. (European Commission, EU ETS, auctioning). 
During phase III (2013-2020) there was a surplus of allowances on the market, as the 
emissions had decreased below projections due to Financial crisis. As the surplus of 
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allowances reduced the allowance price, the surplus disincentivized the technological 
changes to meet the targets in the future.  In 2015 the number of surplus allowances was 2 
billion. Auctioning of 900 million allowances was postponed from 2013-2015 and later 
added to the market stability reserve. A market stability reserve was created as a legislation 
in 2015 and started to operate in January 2019. (European Commission, market stability 
reserve). The rule is that amount of 12 % of allowances in circulation are deducted from the 
annually auctioned cap and placed in the reserve. They are released from the reserve to 
Member states by same proportion as was originally withdrawn when number of allowances 
in circulation is less than 400 million. (Decision (EU) 2015/1814). 
During the phase IV (2021-2030) overall number of allowances will decline at annual rate 
of 2.2 % instead of 1.74 % as in Phase III. The reduction target for 2030 is 43 % compared 
to 2005 level. Free allocation will be focused only on the sectors at the highest risk of 
relocating outside EU. For other sectors free allocation will decline from 2026 from 30 % to 
0 % by 2030. (European Commission, Revision for phase 4). 
2.3 Progress of emission reduction compared to targets 
Emission reduction is real when regulated companies reduce the emissions per unit of output 
without losing market shares for firms with higher emissions (Muûls, Colmer, Martin and 
Wagner, 2016.) 
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Figure 2: Historical emissions of all installations in EU ETS countries. Blue bars reflect current ETS scope 
for allowances and emissions. Source: European Environmental Agency 
Since 2005 emission in manufacturing installation in EU ETS area have decreased by 26 % 
to year 2017 according to the European Environmental Agency’s verified emissions  as seen 
in Figure 2. According to Muûls, Colmer, Martin and Wagner (2016) emission in Europe 
have been dropping before EU ETS. All reduction in Europe cannot be counted as the effect 
of the policy. The financial crisis and following recession dropped the emissions in Europe. 
Difficulties on evaluating the effect of EU ETS on emissions include that there is no data on 
emissions before 2005. It is also difficult to define a control group, as being part of EU ETS 
is not a randomly assigned treatment. 
According to European Commission (2018) EU remains on track to reach its 2020 target of 
reducing GHG emissions by 20 % from 1990 levels. In 2017, EU GHG emissions were down 
by 22 %, according to preliminary data. As Member States’ projections indicate that 
emissions will decrease further, the EU expects to meet its 2020 target. 
In 2005 the total verified emissions in Finland were 33.1 million tonnes. In 2017 emissions 
had dropped by 24 % to 25 million tonnes. (Finnish Energy Authority.) 
The GHG emission intensity of the economy, defined as the ratio between emissions and 
GDP, fell to a record low of 315 g CO2eq. / EUR, which is half the 1990 level. Between 
1990 and 2017, the EU’s combined GDP grew by 58 %, while total GHG emissions 
decreased by 22 %. (European Commission, 2018.) 
Emissions within EU ETS 2005-2017 
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Traditional inventories, such as EU ETS verified emissions, do not include emissions 
associated with imported goods. GHG emissions of production within EU area are part of 
the policy, but emissions associated with the consumption are not. For example, net 
emissions from export and imports for Finland in 2014 were 22 MtCO2 where as China, 
Russia and India were massive emission net exporters (Carbon Brief, 2017). Therefore, as 
the EU ETS policy focuses on emissions from production within its borders, it excludes 
imported emissions associated with the production of imported goods. 
 
Figure 3: Emissions from consumption in EU28 in million tonnes of carbon. Added a point for 20 % reduction 
target compared to 1990 to illustrate the emission development in consumption. Data source: Global carbon 
budget 2018 (Peters, GP, Minx, JC, Weber, CL and Edenhofer, O) 
 
In Figure 3 are illustrated the emissions associated with consumption within EU28 area. It 
seems that emissions are not largely outsourced to other countries. The target to reduce 
emissions by 20 % to 1990 level seems to be fulfilling even if imported emissions are 
included according to the data from Global carbon budget 2018. 
Wagner, Muûls, Martin & Colmer (2014) found at installation-level using survey data from 
French manufacturing that emissions reduction has increased up to 20 % relative to non-ETS 
plants in the first two phases. They observed that the main driver of the reduction seems to 
be lower carbon intensity in the fuels used by the plants. They didn’t find significant 
evidence, that firms would have allocated production from ETS-plants to non-ETS plants. 
They couldn’t take carbon leakage between markets into account to analyse whether this 
900
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could be an important source of the reduction and therefore the estimated 20 % reduction is 
an upper bound. 
But is the emission reduction real or are the carbon emissions leaking to unregulated 
countries as feared beforehand? Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) summarize, that the recent 
evidence appears to offer broad support for the existence of a pollution haven effect, with 
imports of pollution- or energy-intensive goods increasing in response to tighter regulation. 
However, the effects tend to be small and concentrated in a few sectors. 
2.4 Emissions from regulated installations in Finland 
 
Figure 4. Emission of largest installations in Finland in 2018 and their cumulative share of total emissions in 
Finland. Source: Finnish Energy Authority. 
In 2018 there were 454 installation in Finland participating to EU ETS and had positive 
verified emissions according to the installation-level information from Finnish Energy 
Authority. A few largest installations emit a high share of all regulated emissions in Finland. 
30 % of emissions came from the 3 largest installations: SSAB Europe Oy’s steel factory in 
Raahe, Neste Oy’s refinery in Porvoo and Helen Oy’s Hanasaari B -power plant. 50 % of 
the emissions originated from the 10 largest installations. 
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2.5 Finland’s share of revenue EU allowances auctions 
The total cost of the policy for Finnish companies can be analysed from the allowance 
auction data. The auctions of the allowances are held in the European Energy Exchange 
(EEX) since 2016. (European Commission, EU ETS, auctioning of allowances). 
Year Number of 
Allowances 
M 
Revenue 
M EUR 
Average 
price 
2012 2 13.3 6.76 
2013 15.2 67 4.4 
2014 10.8 63.5 5.91 
2015 12.3 93.7 7.64 
2016 13.5 71.2 5.25 
2017 16.5 95.3 5.75 
2018 16.3 251.8 15.68 
 
Finland gain from allowance auctions EUR 252 million in 2018, as the average price almost 
tripled from previous year. In previous years the revenue has been smaller, in 2012 the 
revenue was only EUR 13 million. The decreased share of free allocation in phase III can be 
captured as significant increase in number of auctioned allowances from 2 million to 15 
million in 2013 as seen in Table 1. 
3 THE POSSIBLE RELATION OF THE POLICY TO EARNINGS 
The increased production costs can be passed through to end prices, if the demand is price 
inelastic. This means that the quantity demanded isn’t sensitive to changes in price. But if 
the demand is price elastic, meaning the increased price decreases the demanded quantity 
relatively more, the increased carbon costs must be borne within the supplier. This means 
either diminishing production and therefore also labour needed for the remaining activity or 
finding the most flexible ways within the production function to bear the costs. 
The cost pass-through of the policy costs is considered similarly as tax incidence, when it is 
investigated who bears the cost of taxation regardless of the point the tax revenue is 
collected. The cost of the policy can be considered as a tax. The question who bears the cost 
depends on the extent to which the firm can pass-through these costs to others whether it is 
Table 1. Finland's share of the allowance auction revenues. Source: Finnish Energy Authority 
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the end consumers, but also to the industry to the suppliers of labour, capital, energy and 
materials. (European Commission, 2015.) 
To visually illustrate the case of cost pass-through to end-consumers, we can look at the case 
of production cost increase in the supply-demand diagram. The supply curve shifts left as 
production costs increase by the carbon pricing, ceteris paribus. 
 
Figure 5. Pass-through of increased production costs when demand is perfectly price inelastic and perfectly 
price elastic. Source: Sijm & Chen (2009). 
On the left-hand-side of Figure 5 the demand is perfectly price inelastic, meaning the 
quantity demanded is unaffected by changes in price. As the supply curve shifts left due to 
increased marginal costs, the producer can pass on the increased marginal costs fully to the 
consumers and keep its own surplus unchanged. (Sijm & Chen, 2009.) When demand is 
perfectly price inelastic, the supply side can stay unchanged and there would be no pressure 
for the supply of labour. 
On the right-hand-side of Figure 5, the demand is perfectly price elastic, meaning that the 
price is fixed due to competition. The producer internalizes the emission cost to its output 
decisions and adjusts the production until price equals marginal costs. The quantity decreases 
from Q0 to Q1 and the surplus of the producer diminishes. (Sijm & Chen, 2009.) This 
negative shock would decrease the demand for labour, meaning decreased employment and 
decreased the equilibrium wage. This could be the case if the suppliers produce 
undifferentiated products in competitive market. 
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To illustrate the cost pass-through between demand and supply more closely, the simple 
illustration of Weyl and Fabinger (2013) quantifies the tax incidence. Tax incidence is a ratio 
of tax borne by consumers compared to that borne by producers and cost of the policy 
behaves similarly as a tax. The incidence I equals the ratio of pass-through rates  
I =  
𝜌
(1 – 𝜌)
      (1) 
Where the pass-through rate ρ depends on the elasticities of demand and supply 
ρ =  
1
1+(
𝜖𝐷
𝜖𝑆
)
       (2) 
where  𝜖𝐷 is the elasticity of demand and 𝜖𝑆 is the elasticity of supply 
𝜖𝐷 = -(D´p/Q)      (3) 
𝜖𝑆 = S´p/Q      (4) 
And elasticities mean the relative change in quantities when price changes a little. 
The key point of the equations is to notice that the cost is borne by the inelastic side of the 
market. 
According to European Commission’s report (2015) the pass-through rates to end consumer 
depend on market power, elasticities of demand, the elasticity of domestic supply and 
elasticities of foreign supply. These factors are difficult to study empirically, so measurable 
drivers are used for estimation. Such drivers are trade intensity, transport costs, tariff barriers 
and product substitutability, as well as indicators of market concentration and pricing power. 
(European Commission, 2015.) 
According to the ex-post analysis of the pass-through of carbon costs made by European 
Commission (2015), in addition to elasticity of demand in the EU market, the rate of pass-
through depends also on the marginal cost of supply of EU manufacturers. The more elastic 
the supply curve, the more costs are passed through. Another factor is the marginal cost price 
difference between EU and non-EU manufacturers. If non-EU exporter has perfectly elastic 
marginal cost curve, they can increase export at lower marginal cost than EU producers if 
transport costs are low enough. To compete, EU producers couldn’t pass on the costs. If non-
EU producers already function at full capacity, the marginal cost is increasing when they 
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increase output therefore diminishing their impact on EU producers pass-though. They found 
that market power both within EU and in international markets, including bargaining power, 
and exposure to international competition seem to be among the main driving forces of both 
price formation processes and the ability to pass through carbon costs. 
The emission scheme can cause investment in energy efficient production technologies, to 
pay less for the emission costs. This would change the production function and could make 
the reduction in production unnecessary. This is called input substitution, which is the 
wished outcome of the policy. (Ganapati, Shapiro & Walker, 2016).  
3.1 Hypothesis of the effect of the policy on suppliers 
There are three hypotheses of the overall effect of the policy on regulated installations. First 
one is the pollution haven hypothesis, which assumes that increased environmental costs 
diminish firms’ international competitiveness. (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017.) Therefore, 
regulated companies would lose market shares and even relocate to areas with laxer policies. 
This would mean decrease in demand for labour and negative pressure on the equilibrium 
wages. 
The second hypothesis is Porter hypothesis, which states that because of innovation effect 
and early-mover advantage, the regulated companies would gain market share by being more 
innovative because of the policy (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). Increased efficiency and 
innovative solutions could increase market shares and therefore increase employment and 
equilibrium wages. 
Third hypothesis is zero effect. It could be, that the life span of the policy is too short and 
the policy too lax to affect the firms. As the policy started with a laxed cap and the market 
has flooded with allowance surplus, the costs of carbon emissions could have remained small 
compared to other operational costs of the manufacturing industry, so the policy hadn’t 
impacted the production. 
3.1.1 Pollution haven hypothesis 
According to Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) higher regulatory costs could, for example, 
crowd out productive investment in innovation or efficiency improvements and slow down 
productivity growth. If increased regulatory costs are passed through to product prices in 
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competitive product markets, distortions in trade could occur, as product prices would 
increase more in countries with relatively strict regulation. Companies in countries with 
higher costs will then lose market share to competitors in countries producing emission-
intensive exports more cheaply. If environmental regulatory differences are expected to last, 
companies’ decisions regarding the location of new production facilities or foreign direct 
investment may also be affected, with emission-intensive sectors, and thus manufacturing 
employment, possibly gravitating toward countries with relatively lax policies and creating 
pollution havens. 
Directly in line with the pollution haven hypothesis, the policy could induce relocation of 
regulated companies to laxer policy areas decreasing demand for labour decreasing their 
equilibrium wage. Similarly, if companies downsized their capacity below the EU ETS 
regulatory threshold to avoid the policy, the demand for labour would decrease. 
Indirectly wages could be affected due to uncertainty that surrounds the policy. For 
companies it has been difficult to anticipate how binding the cap will really be and what are 
the future prices. It has also been unclear how much free allocation the firm will get in the 
future and will the policy even hold. This uncertainty could make the company unwilling to 
increase the wages of the employees as the cost of the policy can be somewhat uncertain 
whereas wages are very inflexible downwards. Uncertainty around the costs could have 
decreased willingness to hire new employees. 
3.1.2 Porter hypothesis 
On contrary to pollution haven hypothesis, Porter hypothesis states that environmental 
policy can have a net-positive effect on regulated companies’ competitiveness through 
innovation effect and early-mover advantage. Porter and van der Linde (1995) considered 
competitiveness to be dynamically based on innovation, instead of looking at the world in 
static state, where regulation inevitably raises costs and reduces market share. They argue 
that companies may not be aware of true cost of toxicity, waste, discharges and second-order 
impact waste and that orientation should be shifted from pollution control to resource 
productivity. As they consider environmental regulation in general, the hypothesis can be 
applied to EU ETS. 
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They assume, that stringent environmental regulation can enhance innovation and increase 
efficiency in various ways. Corporate awareness increases as regulation forces them to 
gather information. Regulation signals companies about resource inefficiency and potential 
technological improvements. Uncertainty around the profitability of environmental 
innovations decreases. Regulation creates pressure for innovation and progress. During 
transitions period to innovation-based solutions, other companies can’t opportunistically 
gain position by avoiding environmental investment as policy is mandatory. Before 
innovation-based solutions, regulation improves environmental quality as regulation 
guarantees sufficient emission reduction. Stringent environmental policy can create early-
mover advantage, as early innovators of less polluting technology can profit by selling 
internationally. 
If Porter’s hypothesis would hold, there would be seen higher employment and maybe 
increased earnings of those employed, as high-skilled labour would be more in demand. It 
could be that in the industry some firms may live up to first-mover advantage, but the effect 
doesn’t cover the whole sector. 
Research and development activities take time to become commercialized products. It can 
be that the positive competitive effects of the policy will be more apparent with a long lag. 
3.1.3 Zero effect 
It could be that the total costs of the policy have remained low for the companies, as a high 
share of allowances have been allocated for free and there has been a surplus of allowances 
on the market reducing the allowance costs. If the policy costs compared to other operational 
costs have been hardly noticeable, there would have been no need to pass the costs to end-
prices or to be borne within the supply side. It could be that even though firms know that the 
number of allowances is decreasing, they haven’t made costly investments for emission-
efficient solutions and the supply side have been mostly intact. 
3.2 Share of emission expenditure and personnel costs 
How expensive is the emissions trading policy for the companies under EU ETS? Firms 
don’t explicitly report their emissions expenses in their annual income statement whereas 
personnel costs are specified. To better understand the expenses for the companies, I took 
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Finnish manufacturing company Neste as an illustrative example of how much they have 
paid for emission allowances (EUR 4.2 million in 2017) and what is the share of emission 
costs of total operating expenses (0.04 %). 
3.2.1 Example company: Neste 
Neste is publicly held Finnish company operating in Scandinavia and Russia, which focuses 
on oil finery, oil retail, renewable solutions and marketing and services (Neste’s website).  
Neste had the third largest emission in Finland in 2017 according to Finnish Energy 
authority. According to Neste’s annual report the revenue of Neste corporation was EUR 13 
billion and operating expenses EUR 12 billion. They spent EUR 370 million for personnel 
costs for 5 300 employees. According to the Energy Authority they emitted 3 million tonnes 
of GHG emissions in 2017. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland is 
responsible for the free allocation of allowances in 2013-2020 (in later phases Energy 
Authority has taken that role) and according to their reports they allocated 2.3 million free 
allowances for Neste in 2017. Therefore, Neste had to pay for 736 000 allowances. Using 
closing prices of the EU Emission allowances in Markets insiders the average price of an 
allowance in 2017 was 5.76 euros. Therefore, Neste had to pay approximately EUR 4.2 
million for emission allowances in 2017. According to Finnish Energy Authority Neste 
didn’t receive subsidies for emission trading. Therefore, personnel costs were 3 % of total 
operating expenses in 2017, the emission allowance expenses were only 0.04 %. Even 
though the EUA price increased in 2018 and averaged over 15 euros, the share of emission 
costs wouldn’t increase notably. 
3.2.2 Example installation: Outokumpu’s steel plant in Tornio 
According to Finnish Energy Authority Outokumpu’s stainless steel plant in Tornio was the 
9th highest emitting installation in Finland in 2017 and they emitted 640 302 t CO2. Tornio 
operation is the only fully integrated stainless steel -facility in the world meaning a 
production line from mining to an end-product (Outokumpu’s Tornio website). According 
to free allocation decision made by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of 
Finland, in 2017 they received 612 709 free allowances. Therefore, they had to buy 27 593 
allowances. Using the average price of 5.76 of the allowances for year 2017 as for the Neste 
example, the total cost of emission allowances was approximately EUR 158 900. As 
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Outokumpu is a large corporation with multiple production sites in global locations, they 
don’t enclose the costs of the personnel or production costs of individual factories. In 
Outokumpu’s annual report for 2017 they stated that because of free allocation which is 
based on efficiency-based benchmarks and historical activity, the total free allocation was 
sufficient for European operations, although individual plants were in deficit. Therefore, the 
entire corporation didn’t pay for the allowances in 2017. If only considering the cost of the 
of the steel factory in Tornio the presumed EUR 158 900 for the allowances seems small 
compared to the annual capacity of 1.2 million tonnes of stainless steel per year 
(Outokumpu’s Tornio webpage). 
3.3 Additional costs of the policy 
In addition to paying allowance price for producers’ own emissions, EU ETS policy 
increases costs of the input. For example, electricity producers must comply with the policy 
and they may have passed on the cost to their end-prices. The policy adds these indirect costs 
to intermediate use, transportation and administration. 
Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) estimated that the EU ETS increased average material costs 
(including fuel) for regulated firms by 5 percent to 8 percent. Differences in environmental 
regulations between areas can thus alter the competition between firms by changing their 
relative production costs. For studies that form the control group within the regulated area, 
it is good to keep in mind that through the indirect cost also the unregulated plants are 
affected by the policy. (Martin, Muûls & Wagner, 2016.) 
Participation to EU ETS causes administrative costs for the companies. Heindl (2017) 
studied EU ETS related transaction costs in Germany. These costs include monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV), trading, general information gathering and legal costs. 
Managers were asked an estimation of labour days that have been spend on EU ETS related 
activities. The results of average transaction costs for companies that have more than 249 
employees differed from EUR 0.47 per tCO2 to EUR 0.02 as the emissions grew from 25 
000 to 1 000 000 tCO2. The administrative costs were higher for non-utility companies than 
for utility companies (a supplier of for example gas). 
The idea of the policy is to direct the producers to more eco-friendly practises. As the policy 
had made the firms aware of their emissions, firms may have invested in less-polluting 
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solution to increase their resource-efficiency. These investments would go well beyond what 
firms are currently paying for the allowances. 
3.4 Possible cross-dependencies of earnings 
Participation to the policy is determined for each installation by their sector and maximum 
capacity. On the contrary, earnings of employees between installations are not independent. 
Earnings are strongly related within a same company, but also within a sector and even 
between sectors. Employees in same sector also belong to the same trade unions, which have 
negotiated minimum requirements for the union members and therefore the employer can 
have little impact on the nominal wages apart from hiring and firing. Workers in above and 
below belong to same trade unions and are influenced by same collective bargaining labour 
agreements. This makes the wages to some extent rigid, especially downwards, as the wages 
are not flexibly determined by the demand and supply of labour. 
This cross-dependency of employee contracts smoothens all effects the policy can have on 
the supply of labour. But it probably wouldn’t change the direction or totally dissipate the 
result, if the policy affects installations significantly. 
4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
It seems that the effect of EU ETS on earnings or wages has not yet been studied at 
installation level. Many studies have been conducted at company-level, as the personnel 
costs, number of employees and other financial information is often only available at 
company-level. But as the participation to EU ETS is determined at installation-level, the 
company-level analysis is somewhat underestimating the result. Often participation is 
determined if at least one of firm’s installations functions under EU ETS. Therefore, these 
partly or fully regulated companies are compared to not regulated companies and the 
difference between party participating and non-participating can be minor in terms of costs 
of emissions, as the non-regulated companies also face the indirect costs of the policy. 
The number of peer-reviewed ex-post empirical analysis of EU ETS is somewhat limited, as 
data becomes available with a delay and proper identification strategies are difficult with an 
EU-wide policy. Here we go through relevant empirical findings concerning wages, 
employment, competitiveness and innovation. 
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4.1 Analysis of the effect of EU ETS on wages and employment at company-level 
The closest study relating to our question of EU ETS and earnings was conducted at 
company-level in 2018 using data from 19 EU countries. Marin, Marino and Pellegrin (2018) 
studied the effect of EU ETS on many measures, where treatment group included firms that 
have at least one installation under EU ETS, whereas the control group was composed of 
similar firms with plants that are not part of the policy. They use data from European Union 
Transaction Log (EUTL), which is the register of obligated installations. They link each 
installation to its corresponding parent company using information from Amadeus. They 
used only firms which are present in each time window of the analysis (pre-treatment, Phase 
I and Phase II). With exact matching on sector- and country-level, the analysis could exclude 
macroeconomic unobserved shocks in a flexible way. They looked at manufacturing firms, 
as they are exposed to international competition, which may limit the possibility to pass-
through the emission costs. This means that the burden of dealing with the EU ETS may be 
particularly relevant for manufacturing firms, thus raising the concern of loss of international 
competitiveness of EU firms and, consequently, job losses in the EU manufacturing sector. 
The matched companies represented 74 % of the ETS manufacturing installations in these 
countries and account for 88 % of verified emissions from ETS manufacturing installations 
over the period 2005–2012. 
 
Figure 6. Development of employment, average wage and turnover of matched companies as graphed in paper 
by Marin, Marino and Pellegrin (2018). 
They found during phase I employment decreased by 2 % in regulated companies, but the 
difference wasn’t significant in phase II. The average wage didn’t differ significantly in 
either phases. The turnover was 7 % higher in the second phase in EU ETS group. We can 
also notice from Figure 6 that average wage was inflexible downwards, even though 
employment and turnover decreased in the aftermath of financial crisis. 
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4.2 Employment at installation-level in France 
Wagner, Muûls, Martin and Colmer (2014) found at installation-level using survey data from 
French manufacturing that employment in ETS-plants reduced by 2 % after announcement 
of the EU ETS in 2000 and by 7 % in phase II. They used difference-in-difference approach 
identifying closest match for each ETS-plant among non-ETS plants. This result show that 
at installation-level the effect on employment was a bit higher than at company-level. 
4.3 Installation-level analysis of innovation in UK 
Britain already had its own carbon pricing schemes such as UK ETS and Climate Change 
Agreement in effect when EU ETS was launched in 2005. Plants that were already carbon-
regulated in Britain, could opt out entering to EU ETS up till 2007 or 2008 depending on the 
policy. Calel (2018) exploited this feature and made matching pairs of plants that were under 
UK carbon policy to EU ETS -plants. He found no significant change in adopting existing 
abatement technologies but found increased low-carbon patenting by 25 % and increased 
low-carbon R&D spending by £200,000 annually for typical innovator in 2008. 
4.4 Company-level empirical analysis of financial performance 
Calel et al. (2017) estimates the effect of EU ETS on competitiveness in exploiting 
installation-level inclusion criteria on firms’ revenue, assets and employment up to year 
2012. In this unpublished working paper, they matched installations otherwise almost similar 
apart from whether they are part of the policy or not. Their main finding is that ETS firms 
had a higher increase in revenue and assets and a lower increase in employment compared 
to non-ETS control firms, but the difference was always smaller than 1 standard error. 
Therefore, they find no significant effect of the EU ETS on firms’ revenue, employment and 
assets in the first two phases of the policy. This can be explained by the fact nearly all 
allowances were allocated for free in the first phase and 97 % in the second phase. 
4.5 Electricity pass-through rates in Spain 
Fabra and Reguant (2014) studied the pass-through of emissions costs to wholesale 
electricity market prices in the Spanish electricity market from January 2004 to February 
2006, which overlaps with the launch of EU ETS. They used reduced form and emissions 
price as instrumental variable for marginal emission cost to approximate the pass-through 
 
23 
 
rate of emissions costs using multivariate regression and controlling for hour- and day-
specific supply and demand. They found that more than 80 % of emissions costs were passed 
to electricity prices, meaning that EUR 1 increase in emissions costs increased prices by 
EUR 0.86. 
European Commission (2015) conducted a large-scale analysis of EU ETS cost pass-through 
on the six most polluting sectors in six EU countries. They used a cost-price approach 
explaining the change in price in changes of the input costs trying to find out the coefficient 
for the carbon costs. In refinery sector cost pass-through rates ranged between 80-100% for 
petrol and 100% for diesel and gasoline. They pass-through rate for steel ranged between 55 
% - 100 % depending on the product and region. 
4.6 Summary of the related empirical results 
Effect of EU ETS on Magnitude of the effect 
Emission reduction In 2017 down by 22 % 
(20 % target by 2020) 
Transaction cost 0.02 - 0.47 EUR / allowance 
Depending on economics of scale 
Indirect cost 5 - 8 % increase in material costs 
Pass-through of costs 
in electricity market 
1 EUR increase in allowance price increased end 
prices by 0.86 EUR 
Innovation +25 % low-carbon patenting 
+£200,000/year for low-carbon R&D 
Competitiveness No effect on revenue, assets nor employment 
Calel et al. (2017) 
Employment -2 % in Phase I, no effect in phase II 
(Marin et al. 2018) 
-2% in 2000 when announced and -7 % in phase 
II 
(Wagner et al. 2014) 
Wages No effect 
(Marin et al. 2018) 
Table 2. Summary of related empirical results 
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In Table 2 the empirical results from the literature review and previous chapters are 
combined. Overall it seems that the policy has been able to reach its emissions reduction 
targets with very little negative impact on the competitiveness of the regulated entities. 
5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We evaluate the effect of the EU ETS on earnings of employees in regulated installations. 
We follow the development of earnings of individuals, who worked in regulated 
manufacturing installations just before the policy started at the end of 2004. We follow their 
earnings from year 2000 to see the trend before treatment and the trend after the policy until 
2016. The earnings development is compared to the earnings of a control group, which is 
formed of individuals working in same sectors, but in installations that are not regulated by 
the policy. The difference between installation being part of the policy or not is determined 
by the maximum capacity threshold determined by the EU ETS directive. 
As the policy covers only installations that have a maximum capacity above a threshold 
level, the treatment group and the control group differ systematically as large installations 
are compared to small ones. Also, as there are larger installations in other sectors more than 
in others, the sectors are represented disproportionally in treatment and control groups. This 
is one reason why our setting doesn’t allow an interpretation of a causal relationship, but we 
can investigate the direction of association between the policy and earnings. 
5.1 Data sources 
We use two data sources. Firstly, we recognise the installations under the policy from the 
data of energy use in manufacturing sector between 2007-2016 gathered by Statistics 
Finland. The data would be available since 1990 collected by Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
but the data collection for statistics was revised starting from year 2007 and that’s why our 
first observation year starts in 2007. (Energy use in manufacturing data -webpage). The data 
covers only manufacturing installations, leaving out also regulated and heavy-emitting 
electricity sector and aviation. Concentrating on manufacturing sector seems relevant as 
electricity sector have, according to Fabra and Reguant (2014), a high pass-through of the 
costs to the end prices, most likely leaving the earnings and employment unaffected. The 
data covers years 2007-2016, omitting year 2005 when the policy started, which leads us to 
make assumption that the existence of installations in 2007 reflect sufficiently well the 
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situation in 2005. The data includes installation codes, sector code and whether installations 
was part of EU ETS each year. The data at installation level has been requested from 
Statistics Finland for research purposes. Information of installations maximum capacities 
was not part of the data set. 
Secondly, using installations codes, the group of employees working for these manufacturing 
installations are formed from Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data (FLEED) 
from Statistics Finland. The data includes information of annual earnings of total Finnish 
working population between 1989-2016, as well as background information of workers as 
their age, sex, when they have started to work in the installation and number of personnel on 
the installation. Data is based on end of year information. 
5.2 Identifying treatment and control installations 
As the policy participation information of the installation is limited to start in year 2007, we 
used year 2007 information. If an installation was part of the policy in 2007, it is determined 
as a treated installation. The control installations are formed of non-regulated installation in 
2007, which belonged to same sector that had at least one regulated installation. In this 
analysis installations are considered to function in a same sector, if they have a same sector 
classification code at 5-digit-level. 
The treatment and control group of employees are constructed using the workplace 
information from end of year 2004: those who worked in treated or controlled installations 
at the end of year 2004 are studied. We assume that end of year 2004 reflect well the situation 
in the start of year 2005. Those employees’ earnings are followed between 2000-2016 
regardless what happens to their employment: whether they shift establishments, sectors or 
exit the workforce. Therefore, we investigate the earnings development of individuals, who 
worked in regulated sectors at the end of year 2004, but the pool of installations is 
constructed using 2007 information. 
5.3 Validity of the identifying assumptions and caveats 
To allow a causal interpretation the control group should represent the same population as 
the treatment group to establish a trend of what would have happened without the treatment. 
The control group should reflect the external changes in the business environment regardless 
of the policy: for example, changes in demand and input prices. In such case the control 
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group would differ only in the means of treatment and we could interpret a causal 
relationship. 
In this analysis the sectors are compared somewhat disproportionally as regulated 
installations are larger than unregulated. For example, the sector of manufacture in paper 
and paper products dominates greatly in the treatment group. Therefore, the changes in paper 
sector drives the changes in treatment group without the control group reflecting these 
changes at same proportion. Whether the change is drive by the demand side or by the policy 
remains undetected. 
The information of the installations participation to the policy is from year 2007. This creates 
a survivor bias, as we investigate establishment that still functioned after two years the policy 
started. It could be that some installations have withdrawn from business after the policy 
started. This bias can be minor as the policy started with generous free allocation, but its 
significance remains undetected in this study. 
Other assumptions for a valid control group is that treatment has no impact on the control 
group. This is not fully satisfied, as the establishment outside the policy face the spill-overs 
from the policy as the indirect costs of the policy in their input costs such as increased 
electricity and fuel prices. 
The controlled installation can be influenced also from the demand side. As the installations 
in the same sector are probably encounter the same demand curve, the control group could 
increase their market share, if the policy increases the prices of regulated installations. 
We are not able to detect possible policy avoidance behaviour by downsizing capacity below 
the policy threshold, as the data omits the information of the maximum capacities of the 
installations and doesn’t start before the policy started. 
Keeping these caveats in mind, the results should be interpreted with a caution. The change 
between treatment group and control group can’t be interpreted straight-forwardly to be fully 
influenced by the policy. 
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5.4 Descriptive statistics 
The installation is part of the treatment group if it was part of the EU ETS in 2007. The 
control group is formed of installations that are on the same sector at 5-digit-level than one 
those regulated but is small enough not to be regulated. 
Number of installations under investigation 
Sector Non-ETS 
installation 
ETS-
installation 
Total 
Manufacture of basic metals 3 7 10 
Manufacture of beverages 3 3 6 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemicals products 58 7 65 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 10 3 13 
Manufacture of food products 42 6 48 
Manufacture of motor vehicles trailers and semi-trailers X X X 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 23 17 40 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 11 53 64 
Manufacture of textiles X X X 
Manufacture of wood and wood products 92 14 106 
Mining and quarrying 3 X X 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 38 X X 
Total 286 115 401 
 
Table 3. Number of installations in the treatment and control group. X means that there are less than 3 
observations and the number is hidden for confidentiality. Even though the control group was formed at 5-
digit-level, they are aggregated in this table at 2-digit-level for simplicity. 
In  
Table 3 we can see the number of installations that are EU ETS-regulated in 2007 and the 
controls formed from same sectors that year. Sectors are disproportionately represented in 
treatment and control group. For example, in manufacture of paper and paper products 
there was 53 regulated and 11 non-regulated installations. In manufacture of wood 
products there is much more installations in the control than treatment group. Totally there 
are 115 regulated and 286 unregulated installation used in this set-up. 
Even though there are more installations in the control group, there are more employees 
working in the regulated installations as they are larger. Using information from FLEED, we 
get the number of employees in each installation here illustrated in each sector. 
Number of employees in the treatment and control installations 
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Sector Non- EU 
ETS 
EU ETS Total 
Manufacture of basic metals 404 6 992 7 396 
Manufacture of beverages 126 409 535 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemicals products 4 409 1 893 6 302 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 574 1 663 2 237 
Manufacture of food products 2 246 630 2 876 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
959 1 080 2 039 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 1 381 1 445 2 826 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 1 576 21 767 23 343 
Manufacture of textiles 322 627 949 
Manufacture of wood and wood products 7 374 2 692 10 066 
Mining and quarrying 72 126 198 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 2 282 352 2 634 
Total 21 725 39 676 61 401 
 
Table 4. Number of employees in treatment and control installations at the end of 2004. 
Table 4 we can see that employees in manufacture of paper and paper products are highly 
represented in the treatment group as there is 21 700 employees compared to 1 500 in control 
group. Therefore, changes in the paper sector can drive the results even though they would 
be unrelated to the regulation. Totally there are almost 40 000 employees in the treatment 
group and 22 000 in the control group. 
We follow the changes in the mean earnings of these 39 676 employees working in the EU 
ETS -installations. Their earnings development is compared to the development of the 
21 725 employees from the same sectors. 
Averages of employees' characteristics in 2000  
Non-EU 
ETS 
EU ETS 
Sex (share of men) 0.78 0.80 
Age 37.43 38.86 
Years of employment 12.70 15.95 
Earnings 25 815 30 672 
Number of employments 1.18 1.15 
Number unemployment periods 0.16 0.13 
Number of employees in installation 251 820 
N 21 725 39 676 
Table 5. Means of employees' characteristics before the regulation. 
The background information before the treatment of the employees before the treatment in 
2000 do not differ much in sex ratio, age, number of employments or employment periods 
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as seen in Table 5. Employees in EU ETS-installation have an average three years more 
work experience and they earn more. Also, they work in significantly larger installations, as 
on average there are 820 workers in EU ETS installations compared to 251 in control 
installations. 
6 FINDINGS 
The earnings of individuals in regulated sectors were higher by EUR 5 000 compared to the 
control group before the treatment, and on average the difference was dissipated by EUR 
2875. It seems that the decrease is driven from lower employment level. The earnings of 
those who were employed decreased for the treatment group in 2005, but the earnings 
difference returned after that. 
6.1 Findings of EU ETS and earnings 
First, we look at the descriptive illustration of the mean annual earnings of the treatment and 
control group. Then we introduce the OLS-regressions results of average treatment effect 
and then OLS-regression estimates of yearly effect. 
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Figure 7. Mean of annual earnings in 2000-2016 of the followed employees. The vertical line is the end of year 
2004, marking the last observation year before the regulation. 
In Figure 7 we can see a parallel trend of the mean annual earnings of the EU ETS -regulated 
workers and their control group before the regulation started in the beginning of 2005. The 
parallel trend before the treatment is important for us to be able to consider the selected 
group as relevant control group. The workers in treatments installations earned on average 
EUR 5000 more than the control group before the treatment. The earnings of both groups 
decreased by the time of the financial crisis in 2008. The difference of average earnings 
between the groups seems to have almost dissipated over the years after the policy started. 
The average effect of the policy to the earnings can be interpreted from the OLS regression 
similarly as Calel, Dechezleprêtre, Mohnen & Vehmans (2017) had done in a conference 
paper, which computes the average treatment effect after the policy started: 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 2005 + 𝛽3 ∗ (𝐸𝑇𝑆 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 2005) +     ( 5 ) 
Here the variables ETS, Post 2005 and interaction term ETS * Post 2005 are dummies, 
getting binary values of 0 or 1. The coefficient of ETS indicates the difference between ETS 
and non-ETS employees. Coefficient of Post 2005 reports the mean increase between the 
EUR 
        Mean annual earnings 
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pre-regulation period 2000-2004 and the post-regulation period 2005-2016. The potential 
effect of the EU ETS corresponds to the coefficient β3 of dummy ETS * Post 2005, which 
can be interpreted as the treatment effect. 
The following table represents the results from the OLS regression from panel data 
estimating the average treatment effect. 
  
 
VARIABLES Earnings 
  
 
ETS 4,966***  
(104.6) 
Post 2005 3,355***  
(101.4) 
ETS * Post 2005 -2,875***  
(125.0) 
Constant 30,414***  
(84.84)   
Observations 1,058,034 
R-squared 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6. OLS estimates of average treatment effect of EU ETS. Here comma (,) means a thousand separator 
unlike otherwise in paper. 
The coefficients in Table 6 can be interpreted as, that on average the employees in EU ETS 
-installations earned EUR 4 966 more than their control counterparts. Post 2005 the earnings 
of all participants were EUR 3 355 higher than before the regulation. The coefficient for ETS 
* Post 2005 represents the average treatment effect and it seems that the earnings of workers 
in EU ETS regulated installations earned EUR 2 875 per year less what the trend of the 
control group would have suggested. To put this into proportion, in 2004 the average earning 
of EU ETS worker was 38 963, so this “lost” earnings development was 7.4 % compared to 
that. All the coefficients are significant in this analysis. 
We have also conducted the regression analysis on yearly basis to see the effect of the policy 
on a yearly level. The OLS-regression formula is the following. 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑇𝑆 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
𝑛= 16
𝑖=2001 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ∗ (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗
𝑛= 14
𝑗=2003 ∗  𝐸𝑇𝑆) +    ( 6 ) 
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In this regression the interaction variables for three pre-treatment years are omitted to use 
them as base variables. The interpretation of the of the interaction variables (Yearj * ETS) 
means the yearly change in earnings compared to the difference before the policy. As policy 
is decided at installation-level, the standard errors of the OLS-regression are clustering at 
installation-level, as earnings within a same installation are related to each other. 
To make the analysis more robust, we have included the fixed effect regression models for 
comparison to control for the permanent time invariant change in within installation and 
sectors. Fixed effect analysis at firm level didn’t seem reasonable as firms can have both 
regulated and non-regulated installations. In fixed effect model in general the group means 
are not considered to be dependent on each other. In the fixed affect model (command areg 
in Stata) the corresponding unit-level means are subtracted from each element of dependent 
variable and each element of every column of independent variables and adjusted outcomes 
are regressed on the adjusted covariates and indicators (McCaffrey et al. 2012).  
 
Earnings 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3)  
   
2001 2,603*** 2,609*** 2,606***  
(125.6) (151.7) (154.5) 
2002 3,982*** 3,990*** 3,986***  
(123.4) (151.7) (154.5) 
2003 5,691*** 5,695*** 5,691***  
(214.0) (229.0) (233.2) 
2004 8,138*** 8,132*** 8,135***  
(529.2) (228.9) (233.1) 
2005 9,012*** 9,014*** 9,015***  
(639.7) (229.1) (233.3) 
2006 9,960*** 9,973*** 9,967***  
(1,256) (229.3) (233.5) 
2007 10,319*** 10,337*** 10,328***  
(1,048) (229.5) (233.7) 
2008 9,448*** 9,479*** 9,459***  
(656.3) (229.8) (233.9) 
2009 5,988*** 6,021*** 6,001***  
(745.6) (230.0) (234.2) 
2010 6,171*** 6,197*** 6,182***  
(633.2) (230.3) (234.4) 
2011 6,881*** 6,904*** 6,887***  
(680.9) (230.8) (234.9) 
2012 6,591*** 6,600*** 6,587***  
(731.8) (231.5) (235.7) 
2013 6,333*** 6,340*** 6,327*** 
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(753.9) (232.2) (236.4) 
2014 6,107*** 6,113*** 6,099***  
(790.2) (233.1) (237.3) 
2015 6,070*** 6,066*** 6,055***  
(816.3) (234.3) (238.6) 
2016 6,094*** 6,104*** 6,087***  
(822.2) (236.1) (240.3) 
2003 * ETS 14.18 17.46 20.42  
(256.3) (260.9) (265.6) 
2004 * ETS -584.0 -570.7** -575.8**  
(558.6) (260.7) (265.5) 
2005 * ETS -2,204*** -2,200*** -2,200***  
(761.5) (261.0) (265.7) 
2006 * ETS -1,384 -1,392*** -1,385***  
(1,370) (261.3) (266.0) 
2007 * ETS -2,633** -2,644*** -2,633***  
(1,159) (261.6) (266.3) 
2008 * ETS -2,547*** -2,573*** -2,551***  
(798.9) (261.9) (266.6) 
2009 * ETS -1,985** -2,014*** -1,989***  
(988.2) (262.2) (267.0) 
2010 * ETS -2,903*** -2,925*** -2,906***  
(1,062) (262.5) (267.3) 
2011 * ETS -3,198*** -3,217*** -3,195***  
(1,061) (263.2) (268.0) 
2012 * ETS -3,558*** -3,565*** -3,541***  
(1,115) (264.2) (269.0) 
2013 * ETS -4,059*** -4,064*** -4,037***  
(1,173) (265.1) (269.9) 
2014 * ETS -3,841*** -3,845*** -3,812***  
(1,219) (266.4) (271.2) 
2015 * ETS -3,763*** -3,752*** -3,716***  
(1,296) (268.1) (273.0) 
2016 * ETS -4,124*** -4,134*** -4,077***  
(1,239) (270.6) (275.5) 
ETS 5,084*** - 1,422***  
(870.2) 
 
(145.2) 
Constant 26,325*** 29,661*** 28,724***  
(684.7) (107.3) (145.2) 
    
Installation fixed effect No Yes No 
Sector fixed effect No No Yes 
SE clustered at installation level Yes No No 
    
Observations 1,058,034 1,058,034 1,058,034 
R-squared 0.010 0.070 0.036 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. OLS estimates of yearly treatment effect on earnings. Here comma (,) means a thousand separator 
unlike in rest of the paper. 
We can see in Table 7 that regardless of the chosen model the coefficients for the post-EU 
ETS period and being part of the policy are significant. The standard errors are smallest in 
installation fixed effect model (2). We can se that the coefficients for the post-policy period 
and working in EU ETS installations are negative and over the years decreasing. 
In fixed model at installation level the coefficient for the treatment term ETS is omitted, as 
being part of the policy is time invariant variable and as such it is excluded from fixed effects 
model, which is determined at installation level. 
The coefficients show that the treatment effect on earnings increases over the years and is 
more than -4000 euros for the latest observed year 2016.  
In the following chapters we analyse whether the aggregate decrease in earnings is due to 
decrease in employment or decrease in earnings of those who have remained employed. 
6.2 Employment 
Here we look at the descriptive illustration of the employment level of the treatment and 
control group. Then we analyse the effect of the policy on employment using OLS-
regression clustering the standard errors at installation-level. 
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Figure 8. Share of those fully-employment in treatment and control group. 
As illustrated in Figure 8, it seems that the employment level developed in a parallel trend 
before the policy. In year 2004 the employment rate for both groups were 100 as the groups 
were formed using the working status of that year. It seems that only a few years after the 
policy started the employment rate of EU ETS -workers starts to decrease more than the 
employment rate of the control group. 
Here are the same employment rates in a table. 
 
Share of fully employed 
Year EU ETS 
(%) 
Non- EU ETS 
(%) 
Difference 
(%-units) 
2000 92.0 91.0 1.0 
2001 93.3 92.3 0.9 
2002 94.9 94.3 0.5 
2003 96.2 96.0 0.2 
2004 100.0 100.0 0.0 
2005 94.5 93.9 0.5 
2006 90.0 91.1 -1.1 
2007 86.0 89.4 -3.4 
2008 81.2 85.2 -4.0 
2009 74.2 77.8 -3.6 
Percent 
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2010 72.0 76.7 -4.6 
2011 70.9 74.8 -3.9 
2012 67.7 72.1 -4.3 
2013 64.9 69.3 -4.4 
2014 62.9 66.8 -3.9 
2015 61.6 64.5 -2.9 
2016 61.1 65.2 -4.1 
Table 8. Employment rate of treatment and control group 2000-2016. 
We have analysed the treatment effect on employment using the following OLS-regression: 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑇𝑆 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
𝑛= 16
𝑖=2001 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ∗ (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗
𝑛= 14
𝑗=2003 ∗  𝐸𝑇𝑆) +      ( 7 ) 
Here the dependent variable employment is a binary variable getting value of 1 if worker is 
fully employed and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the OLS-coefficients can be interpreted as how 
many percent units the employment rate changed in each year. 
Employment level  
VARIABLES (1) 
  
 
2001 0.0130***  
(0.00177) 
2002 0.0305***  
(0.00283) 
2003 0.0493***  
(0.00350) 
2004 0.0889***  
(0.00493) 
2005 0.0282***  
(0.00556) 
2006 -0.000205  
(0.00644) 
2007 -0.0173**  
(0.00672) 
2008 -0.0587***  
(0.00870) 
2009 -0.134***  
(0.0121) 
2010 -0.144***  
(0.0118) 
2011 -0.163***  
(0.0125) 
2012 -0.190***  
(0.0133) 
2013 -0.218***  
(0.0134) 
2014 -0.243***  
(0.0133) 
2015 -0.266*** 
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(0.0123) 
2016 -0.259***  
(0.0135) 
2003 * ETS -0.00615  
(0.00430) 
2004 * ETS -0.00808  
(0.00642) 
2005 * ETS -0.00259  
(0.00673) 
2006 * ETS -0.0192**  
(0.00865) 
2007 * ETS -0.0423***  
(0.0106) 
2008 * ETS -0.0485***  
(0.0149) 
2009 * ETS -0.0441**  
(0.0200) 
2010 * ETS -0.0544***  
(0.0196) 
2011 * ETS -0.0474**  
(0.0196) 
2012 * ETS -0.0514**  
(0.0208) 
2013 * ETS -0.0518**  
(0.0203) 
2014 * ETS -0.0472**  
(0.0200) 
2015 * ETS -0.0371*  
(0.0193) 
2016 * ETS -0.0494**  
(0.0198) 
ETS 0.00808  
(0.00642) 
Constant 0.911***  
(0.00493) 
  
SE clustered at installation 
level 
Yes 
  
Observations 1,058,034 
R-squared 0.109 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
Table 9. OLS estimates of the policy effect on employment. 
The results are more statistically significant clustering the standard errors at installation 
level. We can see statistically significant decrease in employment rate in the treatment group, 
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although many interaction coefficients are only statistically significant at p < 0.05 level. For 
example, in 2010 the treatment effect seems to be -0.0544 meaning 5.4 percent unit 
difference in employment. In 2010 the employment rate of the control group was 76.7 %. 
Therefore, the treatment effect translates into 7 % lower employment for the treatment group. 
In the last observation year in 2016, the coefficient at installation level clustering is 
significant at level p < 0.05 showing decrease in employment level by 4.9 percent units. For 
control group employment level of 65.2 this means 7.5 % lower employment 
It seems that the policy has decreased employment of the treatment group, and it is most 
likely the most important factor decreasing the overall earnings. In next chapter we analyse 
the development of earnings of those who remained employed. 
6.3 Earnings of employed 
Here we look at a descriptive illustration of the mean annual earnings of those who were 
employed. Then we do an OLS-analysis on the potential treatment effect on earnings on 
condition that the individuals are employed. 
 
Figure 9. Earnings of those who have been fully employed. 
Year 
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In  Figure 9 we see parallel trend before the treatment in earnings of employed as we saw in 
earnings of all in Figure 7. After the policy started the average earnings of the employed in 
treatment group dropped, unlike the earnings of the control group. Unlike in Figure 7 the 
earnings of employed have increased and the difference between treatment and control group 
seem to have remained after that. 
Here is the same information in the mean annual earnings in a table. 
Mean annual earnings of employed 
Year EU ETS Non- EU ETS Difference 
2000 33 132 28 572 4 560 
2001 35 750 30 413 5 337 
2002 36 669 31 475 5 193 
2003 38 039 33 059 4 980 
2004 39 380 34 915 4 465 
2005 38 526 35 749 2 777 
2006 42 789 39 424 3 365 
2007 43 966 40 527 3 438 
2008 44 968 40 784 4 183 
2009 44 611 39 209 5 402 
2010 45 923 40 777 5 146 
2011 47 523 42 878 4 645 
2012 48 444 43 823 4 621 
2013 49 120 45 164 3 956 
2014 50 610 46 066 4 544 
2015 51 725 47 128 4 597 
2016 51 990 47 607 4 383 
Table 10. Mean annual earnings of employed and the difference between treatment and control group. 
Here we have run a similar OLS-regression model of earnings than for all, but now only for 
those who have been employed. Here the standard errors are only clustered at installation 
level. 
Earnings of employed 
 
VARIABLES    
2001 2,311***  
(142.1) 
2002 3,236***  
(118.9) 
2003 4,506***  
(199.6) 
2004 5,931***  
(495.7) 
2005 8,246***  
(639.3) 
2006 10,405*** 
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(1,333) 
2007 11,664***  
(1,105) 
2008 11,906***  
(668.5) 
2009 10,534***  
(829.4) 
2010 12,098***  
(691.0) 
2011 14,245***  
(668.3) 
2012 15,197***  
(770.7) 
2013 16,463***  
(782.7) 
2014 17,325***  
(902.7) 
2015 18,294***  
(1,008) 
2016 18,865***  
(1,075) 
2003 * ETS 79.98  
(213.3) 
2004 * ETS -569.7  
(513.0) 
2005 * ETS -2,302***  
(748.6) 
2006 * ETS -1,029  
(1,422) 
2007 * ETS -1,147  
(1,161) 
2008 * ETS -397.0  
(729.6) 
2009 * ETS 750.5  
(942.5) 
2010 * ETS 465.9  
(866.6) 
2011 * ETS -6.212  
(875.2) 
2012 * ETS -126.9  
(960.6) 
2013 * ETS -648.4  
(1,000.0) 
2014 * ETS -90.22  
(1,126) 
2015 * ETS 18.33  
(1,300) 
2016 * ETS -303.4  
(1,266) 
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ETS 5,070***  
(838.1) 
Constant 28,532***  
(668.3) 
  
SE clustered at installation level Yes   
Observations 859,750 
R-squared 0.052 
  
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 11. OLS estimates of the difference in earnings of those who are employed. Here comma (,) means a 
thousand separator unlike in rest of the paper. 
The interesting finding of the coefficient in Table 11 for the interaction terms only the term 
2005 * ETS is statistically significant and negative as much as -2 302. Also, the ETS has 
significant coefficient 5 070, showing that the difference between treatment and control 
group remained high even after the policy as the interaction terms are not significant. 
6.4 Result discussion 
The earnings of those who worked in installations that were regulated by the policy earned 
more before the policy, but the difference have dissipated. This seems to be affected by their 
lower employment rate. Only when the policy started the earnings of those were employed 
nominally decreased and even more so compared to development in the control group. 
It can be that the lower employment is due to reduction in production, which has been 
influenced by the increased carbon costs. The result doesn’t tell whether companies have 
relocated to regions with laxer policies to avoid the costs of the policy or what is the 
underlying mechanism. The timing for the decrease in employment doesn’t seem to be 
affected by the financial crisis, as employment has started be lower before year 2008. 
A significant treatment effect of earnings of employed in 2005 by amount of -2 300 could 
be likely driven by uncertainty of the costs of the policy, as then a high share of allowances 
was allocated for free. The uncertainty seems to have dissipated over the years. 
The follow-up of the workers doesn’t straight-forwardly reflect the employment rate within 
the sector, as we started to follow employed individuals, who can only either keep being 
employed or get unemployed or exit the workforce. Therefore, our analysis doesn’t straight-
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forwardly reflect the employment level of the studied industries. It reflects what happened 
to the workers whose workplaces were initially influenced by the policy. 
The earnings of those who remained employed could be boosted by a positive selection bias, 
as most likely the least productive workers have been unemployed and therefore most likely 
the high earners have stayed. As the earnings in both groups seem to develop in a parallel 
trend, this kind of positive bias would be anyway very small. 
6.5 Caveats and limitations 
Energy use in manufacturing sector data is limited to year 2007, even though the policy 
started in 2005. First the regulated installations were recognized in 2007, which already 
created a survival bias, as only those that were still operating in year 2007 were investigated. 
It could be that we have missed a relevant part of installations that have already run out 
business during this time. 
Also, installations that have started after 2005 but are running in 2007 would be omitted 
from our analysis, as we wouldn’t recognise any workers working in these at the end of year 
2004.  
The control group of this set-up is somewhat problematic as different sectors are represented 
at different levels in control and treatment groups. Therefore, external influences for the 
manufacturing sector apart from EU ETS may not be fully reflected to the control group. For 
example, the paper industry is heavily represented in the treatment group and less so in the 
control group. Changes in the demand for paper products therefore influences outcomes of 
the treatment group and these changes are not fully internalized in the development of the 
control group. 
The validity of the difference-in-differences comes from the assumption that the trend of the 
outcome variable would have been similar in treatment and control groups without the 
treatment. (Marin, Marino, Pellegrin, 2018). Therefore, we should be able to show, that the 
trend in outcome variable earnings developed similarly before the treatment between the two 
groups. Ideally, we should have information of the plants, their productivity, revenue, but as 
these are company-level information, we can’t compare them. 
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Because of these reasons the results should be read with care and taken only as indicative 
starting point for further investigation for the effect of the policy on employment and 
earnings. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Main conclusions 
It seems that the earnings of employees in the ETS-regulated installations were almost EUR 
5 000 per year higher compared to the earnings of employees in non-regulated installation 
in same industries before the policy started. The difference has declined after the policy 
started on average by EUR 2 875 per year. The decline seems to arise from lower 
employment level, which have significantly decreased by more than 4 percent units after 
year 2010 compared to the controls which translates into 7 % decrease in employment. 
The earnings of those who remain employed in the treatment group has remained higher 
compared to controls. The earnings of those who remained employed had a negative 
treatment effect of EUR 2 300 right after the policy started, probably reflecting the 
uncertainty around the costs of the policy. Apart from that year we couldn’t recognise 
treatment effect for the earnings of employed. 
Whether the decline in earnings development is driven from the policy or from the other 
changes in the industries under investigation is not fully excluded from this analysis, as the 
sectors are represented by different proportions in the control group. 
The result is similar as what Wagner, Muûls, Martin & Colmer (2014) found at installation-
level in France, where employment decreased by 7 % in the phase II, but higher what Marin, 
Marino & Pellegrin (2018) found at company-level analysis. 
We have studied the effect at installation-level, which makes the results more precise as the 
policy is determined at installation-level. Our set-up also differs from many others as we 
have followed the individuals. 
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7.2 Practical implications of the results 
Out of the three hypothesis we had, it seems that the lower employment rate indicates that 
the pollution haven hypothesis holds. It could be that these jobs are lost due to reduction in 
production or that companies have relocated. As the policy have been able to reach its 
emission reduction targets and it seems that at EU-level the emissions of consumption have 
also reduced accordingly, it makes sense that the policy imposes also some trade-offs. In the 
light of these results, the trade-off seems to be the unemployed workers. A truly causal 
interference would need further investigation. 
7.3 Suggestions for further research 
The challenge of the ex-post evaluation of the effects of the regulation is to find out a causal 
relation between the policy and the changes in the outcome variables. Ideally, we would like 
to compare EU ETS firms to non-EU ETS firms facing similar demand, have similar 
resources, having same input prices and function under same regulation apart from EU ETS. 
As this is not possible, we can try to exploit the implementation of the policy, that EU ETS 
was designed to include only large installations. For example, steel plants with production 
capacity of 2.5 tonnes per hour are included, but plants with lower capacities are not. (Calel 
et al. 2017). As maximum capacity is somewhat fixed character of existing technology, it 
could be that plants around the threshold in the same sectors are to large extent similar to 
those below the threshold, or at least they don’t systematically differ. For such analysis the 
data should include information of the maximum capacities to be able create a treatment and 
control groups around the threshold. Then it would be important to look at the distribution 
of installations around the threshold and investigate whether the avoidance of the policy 
would have changed the distribution. A problem with this approach could be that the number 
of installations around the threshold is too small for statistical interpretation. 
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